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ABSTRACT: In this chapter, I will present an empirical conjecture to the effect 
that some bodily actions are categorically perceived. These are bodily actions such 
as grasping or reaching for something, which I am going to call motor actions. My 
conjecture builds on one recently put forward about how the categorical 
perception of facial expressions of some emotions works. I shall motivate my own 
conjecture on the basis of both theoretical and empirical considerations, describe 





In this chapter, I am going to present an empirical conjecture about the way in 
which some bodily actions are perceptually processed. These are bodily actions 
such as grasping or reaching for something, which I am going to call motor 
actions (more on their characterisation in section 2). My conjecture has it that 
humans categorically perceive motor actions (the notion of categorical perception 
will be explained in section 3). This conjecture builds on and complements one 
recently put forward by Stephen Butterfill (2015), which is based on evidence to 
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the effect that humans categorically perceive facial expressions of some emotions 
(e.g., Etcoff and Magee 1992; Calder et al. 1996; see also Kotsoni et al. 2001). 
This evidence and the related conjecture will be presented in section 4. 
In section 5, I shall present my own conjecture, to the effect that motor 
actions are categorically perceived. I will motivate this conjecture on the 
following grounds: a significant structural analogy exists across motor actions, the 
expressions of some emotions and the articulations of phonemes, insofar as all are 
actions directed to motorically represented outcomes (a notion that will be 
explained in due course), and may be categorically perceived as such.  
Why should you be interested in a conjecture based on another 
conjecture? Because I believe these to be two sides of the same coin, and 
considering them jointly provides a useful unifying theoretical framework for 
interpretation and for further testing. In section 6, I will describe the explanatory 
gain that can be obtained from my proposed conjecture in terms of the 
interpretation of data about the neural mechanisms involved in the processing of 
motor actions. 
 
2. What are motor actions? 
 
I am now going to introduce the notion of motor action.1 Consider a situation in 
 
1 The term motor action has been widely used in the study of action production, 
both in neuroscience (e.g., Gallese et al. 1996; Hamilton and Grafton 2007; 
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which I pick up a plum. What are the conditions under which it is correct to say 
that the plum has been grasped (as opposed to, e.g., pushed away)? In the most 
ordinary cases, these conditions will include that I end up with the plum held 
between my palm and my fingers. But it is also possible to imagine a situation in 
which my hands are occupied, or are somehow blocked, or do not exist at all, and 
I have to grasp the plum with my mouth or with my feet. Not any body part will 
do (I cannot grasp anything with my nose, due to anatomical constraints), but 
some body part has to be employed. The essential feature, then, for the 
characterisation of a motor action such as grasping something is that it involves 
one of a circumscribed set of body parts, which has to undergo a certain change—
one, for instance, that brings it in a specific relation to a given object. In the light 
of the above, I shall call motor actions actions such as grasping, whose 
characterisation unavoidably involves mention of body parts and their 
configurations and an object in relation to which these configurations unfold. To 
clarify, compare a motor action—e.g., grasping—with the action of, e.g., 
designing an experiment. No specific body part is involved in the accomplishment 
 
Jeannerod 1994, 2006; Rizzolatti et al. 1996) and philosophy (e.g., Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia 2014; Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani 2019; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017; 
Nanay 2013; Pavese 2015). I am, however, introducing this term with a specific 
meaning, to be illustrated shortly, that does not straightforwardly coincide with 
how this term has been employed in the aforementioned literatures, although it is 
likely consistent with it. 
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of the latter, nor is any circumscribed set of bodily movements. 
Notice that motor actions cannot be specified exclusively in terms of the 
corresponding final bodily configurations. Consider as an example the action of 
catching something. One may believe it sufficient to characterise the action of 
catching a ball in terms of the ball being held between one’s hands. But this is not 
sufficient, insofar as it cannot be said that a ball has been caught if the ball being 
held between one’s hands is the result of someone carefully placing it there: 
without the specification that one has performed certain bodily movements, it is 
false that she has caught the ball (see Pacherie 2008). Because of this, a motor 
action should be specified by reference to a circumscribed set of sequences of 
bodily configurations, and not only the final one. So, motor actions are actions 
whose characterisation unavoidably involves mention of sequences of bodily 
configurations. This is a characterisation in purely behavioural terms. In the 
following sections, I shall propose a conjecture to the effect that humans 
categorically perceive motor actions. I will begin by characterising the notion of 
categorical perception. 
 
3. The premise: humans categorically perceive facial expressions of 
some emotions 
 
When human subjects are asked to discriminate between pairs of faces that 
express a certain emotion, their responses exhibit a very specific pattern of 
discrimination. Presented with several pairs of faces that differ by a fixed physical 
 5 
amount, created by morphing a face expressing a certain emotion (happiness) into 
a face expressing another emotion (fear), subjects are better at discriminating pairs 
where each member expresses a different emotion, rather than pairs where both 
members express the same emotion (Etcoff and Magee 1992; see also Calder et al. 
1996; Kotsoni et al. 2001). In a separate task, subjects are also asked to identify 
the stimuli that they are presented with as expressing one of two possible emotions 
(say, happiness or fear). Subjects are consistent in identifying stimuli that do not 
fall too close to the category boundary, whereas they are at chance (that is, they 
identify the face stimulus as happy or sad with equal frequency) when it comes to 
identifying stimuli that fall too close to the category boundary (Calder et al. 1996). 
When such patterns of discrimination are exhibited in relation to a certain 
domain—i.e., some pairs of stimuli are easier to discriminate than others, and, 
moreover, what explains this is that those pairs of stimuli fall in different 
categories recognised by the subjects—it is said that subjects have categorical 
perception for that domain (Repp 1984; Harnad 1987; McKone et al. 2001; 
Harnad 2003).2 According to Harnad (2003), specifically, perceived differences 
 
2 Some important clarifications are in order. Hereafter I will discuss conjectures 
concerning the recognition of emotions on the part of an observer, but I shall not 
make any claims about the nature of emotions. As to the latter, there is a 
controversy on which I do not mean to adjudicate between whether the nature of 
emotions is categorical or basic rather than dimensional. According to the basic 
view of emotions (Ekman 1992; Izard 1971; Tomkins 1962), emotions fall into 
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between stimuli within a category are smaller than the actual physical differences 
between those stimuli, and/or perceived differences between stimuli across a 
category boundary are larger than the actual physical differences between those 
stimuli (Harnad 2003).3 
 
discrete categories, which are reflected in the information provided by cues such 
as facial expressions and body postures. According to the dimensional view of 
emotions, by contrast, rather than falling into discrete categories, emotions arise 
from combinations of degrees of arousal and valence, two distinct dimensions 
whose values vary in a continuous way, without giving rise to clear-cut category 
boundaries (Russell 1980). It is crucial to notice that some authors have taken the 
aforementioned results supporting the view that the recognition of emotions takes 
place by means of categorical perception as support for a categorical view of the 
nature of emotions. Fugate (2013) points out that this is a mistake: she refers to 
evidence provided by Young and colleagues (1997) and Fujimura and colleagues 
(2011) suggesting that both categorical and dimensional information might be 
drawn on in categorical perception. I am grateful to the editors of this volume for 
pointing out this potential source of misunderstanding. 
3 Harnad (2003) also offers a version of this definition to accommodate the case of 
learned categorical perception. In this version, the term of comparison is not 
actual physical differences between stimuli but rather perceived similarity 
between the stimuli within and across category boundaries before learning. I am 
grateful to a reviewer of this volume for inviting me to report Harnad’s definition. 
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Evidence suggests that humans have categorical perception for a number 
of other domains in addition to facial expressions of emotion, including speech 
(Liberman et al. 1957; Eimas et al. 1971), colour (Bornstein and Korda 1984), 
orientation (Wolfe et al. 1992) and face identity (Beale and Keil 1995; Kikutani et 
al. 2008).  
The colour case is illustrative of the sort of phenomena that the notion of 
categorical perception is supposed to explain. For example, I mentioned that pairs 
of stimuli falling in different categories are easier to discriminate. Bornstein and 
Korda (1984) showed that pairs of hues can be told apart comparably quickly, 
even though they may be more or less different in purely physical terms, so long 
as each belongs to a different colour category. Conversely, pairs of hues that 
belong each to a different colour category can be told apart more quickly than any 
pair of hues that belong to the same colour category. This is so in spite of the fact 
that the pair of hues belonging to the same colour category might be more 
different from each other in physical terms than the pair of hues that belong each 
to a different colour category. Thus, ease of discrimination is shown not to depend 
straightforwardly on physical differences, but, rather, is a function of the 
categories to which the stimuli belong.4 
 
4 Studies that hinge on physical differences are subject to a potential objection: 
couldn’t it be that same physical differences are treated differently by the retina 
and therefore end up being perceived differently by the subjects? A study by 
Witzel and Gegenfurtner (2014) counters this objection by using just-noticeable 
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Another phenomenon that the notion of categorical perception is 
supposed to explain is the occurrence of pop out effects. Daoutis and colleagues 
(2006) have shown that, given an array of coloured dots, all of the same colour 
except for one, the time it takes to find the odd one out does not increase as a 
function of the number of dots when the odd one out is of a different colour 
category with respect to the other dots. That is, hues falling into different colour 
categories pop out. 
The evidence reported earlier in this section (Etcoff and Magee 1992; 
Calder et al. 1996) gives us reasons for thinking that humans have categorical 
perception of facial expressions of some emotions. The qualification some is 
justified by the fact that the stimuli employed in the earlier reported experiments 
typically involve happy and fearful faces. It might therefore be safer to claim that 
it is only for the expression of some emotions that humans have categorical 
perception.  
There might be a principled reason behind this, namely that some 
emotions lend themselves to a more straightforward connection with their bodily 
expression than others (such as Schadenfraude).5 That is, it is plausible that some 
 
differences instead of physical differences. A just-noticeable difference (JND) is 
the smallest difference between two stimuli that a subject can perceive. 
5 This leaves it open that the connection in question could be mediated by factors 
such as conceptual knowledge (Brooks and Freeman 2018) or culture (see 
Caruana and Viola 2018). 
 9 
emotions may have more easily identifiable characteristic expressions associated 
with them. 
So far, I have introduced the notion of categorical perception and have 
reported evidence that the facial expressions of some emotions are categorically 
perceived. On the basis of this evidence, Butterfill (2015) puts forward the 
following conjecture: facial expressions of emotions could be categorically 
perceived insofar as they are actions directed to motorically represented outcomes 
(a notion that will be defined in the next section). I shall now present this 
conjecture, along with how it is supported by current evidence. This will provide 
the springboard for my own conjecture, which I will introduce in section 5.  
 
4. What are facial expressions of emotions? The AMROs conjecture 
 
In this section, I am going to present Butterfill’s conjecture that facial expressions 
of emotions are actions directed to a motorically represented outcome (AMROs), 
and are processed as such within the context of categorical perception (Butterfill 
2015). I shall explain the notion of AMRO first by reference to the case of speech, 
and will then show how this notion can be applied to the case of facial expressions 
of emotions. 
 
4.1 Phoneme articulations as AMROs 
Speech is one of the most extensively studied cases of categorical perception (e.g., 
Liberman et al. 1957; Eimas et al. 1971; Harnad 1987; Nygaard and Pisoni 1995; 
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Harnad 2003). Here is evidence that we categorically perceive speech. It is 
possible to create a series of test stimuli consisting in sounds that spread across the 
phonemes ba and pa. These are designed in such a way that each two 
neighbouring test sounds differ from one another by the same amount (in terms of 
frequency) as any other pair of neighbouring sounds (the test stimuli consisting in 
facial configurations described in section 3 were created on the basis of an 
analogous principle). Subjects find it hard to discriminate neighbouring pairs of 
test sounds, except when two neighbouring pairs fall on two different sides of a 
category boundary—i.e., one is perceived as ba and the other as pa. Within the 
same category, on the other hand, subjects will hear the same phoneme, e.g., ba 
(Liberman et al. 1957). 
 So, humans categorically perceive speech, and the categories consist in 
phonemes. But what are phonemes? An interpretation that has been put forward 
(e.g., by Liberman and Whalen 2000) is that a phoneme is an outcome, i.e. a state 
of affairs, to which an action is directed.6 What distinguishes outcomes (in the 
 
6 This closely resembles the idea that phonemes are intended gestures of a 
speaker, which is the heart of the Motor Theory of Speech Perception (Liberman 
et al. 1957; Liberman and Mattingly 1985). The Motor Theory of Speech 
Perception has a complex history, and its evaluation is made difficult by the fact 
that it encompasses several different claims, whose fate has proved very different. 
Galantucci and colleagues (2006) helpfully break the Motor Theory of Speech 
Perception down into different claims: “(1) speech processing is special, (2) 
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case of speech, consisting in phonemes) from mere acoustic signals? The 
distinction is twofold. First, different acoustic signals could be employed to 
articulate the same phoneme. This is shown by the fact that we have categorical 
perception of speech: as mentioned earlier, a number of different acoustic signals 
will be treated as the same phoneme (e.g., pa) by a perceiver. In addition to this 
(and this goes beyond the idea that we categorically perceive speech), single 
acoustic signals by themselves may not be diagnostic of what phoneme is being 
articulated: the same single acoustic signal, depending on contextual factors such 
as speed of articulation or dialect, could result from the articulation of different 
phonemes (see, e.g., Repp and Liberman 1987). 
  So far, I have presented reasons in support of the idea that phonemes 
should be considered outcomes, and how this differs from considering them 
merely acoustic signals. The idea, in short, is that the same phoneme could be 
articulated through different acoustic signals, and the same acoustic signal could 
result from different phonemes being articulated. Building on this, Butterfill 
(2015) hypothesises that articulations of phonemes may be characterised as 
 
perceiving speech is perceiving gestures, and (3) the motor system is recruited for 
perceiving speech.” Galantucci and colleagues argue that (1) is likely false, but 
that (2) and (3) still find support. Claim (3) has recently been vindicated by 
Whalen (2019). In this chapter, I am exploiting precisely claims (2) and (3) of the 
Motor Theory of Speech Perception, but not (1). 
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actions directed to motorically represented outcomes—henceforth, AMROs for 
short. 
 But what is a motorically represented outcome? It is an outcome 
represented by motor areas of the brain. The best evidence that an outcome is 
represented motorically is that a marker of motor processing, e.g. neuronal 
discharge (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014, p. 122) that is recorded in motor areas of 
the brain, or motor evoked potentials, can be found in correlation with an outcome 
being brought about.7 Butterfill suggests that phonemes could be motorically 
represented outcomes insofar as articulating a phoneme requires coordinated 
 
7 These markers of motor processing are often discussed under the heading of 
motor representations. The idea that motor representations might represent 
outcomes rather than just fine-grained bodily movements has given rise to what 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014) call the Interface Problem: how do the outcomes 
represented by intentions and the outcomes represented by motor representations 
non-accidentally match? Answers to this problem have been discussed by 
Butterfill and Sinigaglia themselves (2014), as well as by Mylopoulos and 
Pacherie (2017), Ferretti and Zipoli Caiani (2019) and Shepherd (2019). There are 
also motor representations representing an action in greater detail—for example, 
that represent grasping with a specific body part (e.g., one’s hand) and with a 
specific kind of grip (e.g., a precision grip—the one you would typically adopt to 
grasp a peanut; Rizzolatti et al. 1988). For a more extended discussion of what 
motor representations represent, see Ferretti (2016). 
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movements of the vocal organs—lips, tongue tip, tongue body, tongue root, velum 
and larynx (see, e.g., Goldstein and Fowler 2003).  
 To this, I would like to add that precisely this sort of rationale—that 
bringing about a certain outcome requires a series of movements coordinated 
around the outcome—has led neuroscientists to posit that actions should be 
represented in the brain, in a way that abstracts away from the details of the bodily 
movements but is also sensitive to a certain outcome being achieved (Jeannerod 
1994, 2006). So, it seems plausible to suppose that not only are phonemes 
outcomes, but they are motorically represented outcomes.  
 On the basis of this idea, it is possible to hypothesise that the categories 
into which the categorical perception of speech sorts acoustic signals are 
motorically represented outcomes, and that articulations of phonemes are 
processed as AMROs in the context of cateogorical perception. This is an 
interpretation of what goes on in the categorical perception of speech that 
suggested by, e.g., Liberman and Whalen (2000). 
 
4.2 Expressing emotion as an AMRO 
How is this relevant to the categorical perception of facial expressions of 
emotions? Because Butterfill (2015) conjectures that facial expressions of 
emotions, as acoustic signals according to the interpretation reviewed in the 
previous subsection, could be categorically perceived as AMROs, rather than 
merely as facial configurations. This is based on the idea that an emotion being 
expressed is a motorically represented outcome. Let me show how this idea is 
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justified, before moving on to the conjecture in the next subsection.  
 A contrast between facial configurations and emotions being expressed can 
be set up, analogously with that between acoustic signals and phonemes. As with 
speech, the evidence to the effect that we categorically perceive facial expressions 
of emotions indicates that multiple facial configurations (e.g., more or less wide 
smiles) can be involved in the same emotion (e.g., happiness) being expressed. 
But, to support the idea that emotions being expressed are outcomes rather than 
just facial configurations, we also need evidence that single facial configurations 
are not necessarily diagnostic of emotions, i.e. may be taken to express different 
emotions depending on contextual factors.  
 Aviezer and colleagues (2008) provide just this sort of evidence. They 
show that the very same facial configuration can be taken to express different 
emotions depending on the context into which it is inserted—specifically, the 
overall bodily configuration of the individual exhibiting that facial configuration. 
For instance, the very same facial configuration on an individual’s face can be 
verbally classified by an observer as either disgusted or proud depending on the 
overall bodily configuration of the observed individual—i.e., whether the 
individual with this facial configuration is holding a disgusting object or is 
engaged in a power pose.  
 So, both conditions for emotions being expressed to be outcomes are 
fulfilled: the same emotion can be expressed through different facial 
configurations, and the same facial configuration can express different emotions 
depending on contextual factors.  
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 But why think that emotions being expressed should be motorically 
represented outcomes? In response to this, Butterfill presents a line of reasoning 
analogous to the one provided in relation to the case of speech: 
 
expressing an emotion by, say, smiling or frowning […] involves 
making coordinated movements of multiple muscles […]. That such 
an expression of emotion is a goal-directed action follows just from 
its involving motor expertise and being coordinated around an 
outcome […].  (Butterfill 2015, p. 446) 
 
That expressing emotions relies on motor expertise is further supported 
by evidence that motor programs seem to have a fundamental role in the 
production of emotions, so that tampering with motor programs imposes limits on 
one’s own emotional experience (see Davis et al. 2010).8 
 
4.3 Butterfill’s conjecture: facial expressions of emotions are processed 
as AMROs in categorical perception 
To sum up, so far I have presented reasons for thinking that emotions being 
expressed are outcomes, not reducible to facial configurations. Now on to 
Butterfill’s conjecture. This has it that, when facial expressions of emotions are 
 
8 I am grateful to the editors of this volume for bringing this evidence to my 
attention. 
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categorically perceived, these are processed as actions—specifically, AMROs—
rather than merely as facial configurations. In other words, the stimuli consisting 
in facial configurations would trigger a hypothesis about which motorically 
represented outcome is being pursued—e.g., happiness being expressed—and, 
consequently, about which action is being performed in order to achieve that 
motorically represented outcome—e.g., expressing happiness. 
 Butterfill’s conjecture about the categorical perception of facial 
expressions of emotions, by his own admission, requires that “the things 
categorised in in categorical perception of expressions of emotions are events 
rather than configurations or anything static” (2015, p. 446). While the idea that 
acoustic signals are processed as actions may have seemed reasonable given that 
acoustic signals are dynamic stimuli, the idea that facial configurations are 
processed as actions might seem surprising. In response to this concern, Butterfill 
observes that his conjecture is not in principle incompatible with the fact that the 
categorical perception of expressions of emotions may be triggered by static 
stimuli, such as the facial configurations described in section 3. In support of this 
idea, he cites evidence to the effect that static stimuli are sufficient to trigger 
motor programs in an observer (Borghi et al. 2007).  
 In the light of this conjecture, the data about categorical perception of 
facial expressions of emotions reviewed in section 3 could be explained in the 
following way: pairs of stimuli that fall in the same category are treated in the 
same way because they can be interpreted as part of actions directed to the same 
motorically represented outcome: that happiness (or fear) is expressed. 
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Interpreting the data in this way makes room for the fact that, if the stimuli were 
made more complex so as to include wider bodily configurations, contextual 
factors affecting their categorisation could be taken into account, just as 
contextual factors may affect the categorical perception of speech. 
 Butterfill supports his conjecture on the basis of a few considerations. 
Among these, there is the idea that facial expressions of emotions and phonemes 
are analogous in a number of ways—e.g., facial configurations alone might not be 
diagnostic of emotions, in the same way in which isolated acoustic signals might 
not be diagnostic of phonemes, and both are open to the influence of contextual 
factors in determining which emotion or phoneme is detected by an observer. 
Moreover, Butterfill points out that when stimuli are chosen in order to test the 
categorical perception of facial expressions of emotions, the guiding principle is 
not which facial configuration is more likely to be associated with a given 
emotion, but rather which facial configuration is more likely to express a given 
emotion. Therefore, his conjecture is in line with how the stimuli are categorised 
in the first place, and makes sense for plausible analogies between facial 







5. A complementary conjecture: humans categorically perceive motor 
actions 
 
I would now like to go back to motor actions, introduced in section 2, and present 
a conjecture that builds on and complements Butterfill’s one. According to my 
conjecture, humans would categorically perceive motor actions. This is based on 
the idea that motor actions are AMROs. Let me provide reasons in support of the 
latter idea first, and then explain why this motivates considering the possibility 
that motor actions could be categorically perceived. In the next section, I will 
show the explanatory gain to be obtained from this conjecture. 
 
5.1 Motor actions are AMROs 
In order to show why it is reasonable to consider motor actions AMROs, i.e. 
actions directed to motorically represented outcomes, let me start by showing why 
motor actions should be thought of as directed to outcomes.  
 This is easily done. Recall from section 2 that motor actions were defined 
in behavioural terms as actions whose characterisation unavoidably involves 
mention of sequences of bodily configurations. Grasping is a paradigm example of 
a motor action.  
 Now, something being grasped should be considered an outcome, as 
opposed to merely a bodily configuration (or series of bodily configurations), for 
the following reasons. First, multiple different bodily configurations may be 
employed to achieve the outcome of something being grasped. The latter could be 
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achieved by using thumb and index finger in different configurations (e.g., with a 
smaller or greater distance between the fingertips), or using all of the fingers on 
one’s hand, or even using a different effector (e.g., the mouth as opposed to the 
hand). On the other hand, the same series of bodily configuration (e.g., one’s 
fingers closing around the handles of a pair of pliers) may achieve different 
outcomes (e.g., something being grasped, or something being released) depending 
on contextual factors (in this case, the shape of the pliers).9 Therefore, motor 
actions such as grasping are directed to outcomes (something being grasped), 
which are interestingly different from bodily configurations: the same outcome 
can be achieved by different sequences of bodily configurations, and the same 
sequence of bodily configuration can lead to different outcomes. 
 Now, why think that these outcomes are motorically represented? As 
mentioned in section 4.1, the ideal evidence for an outcome being motorically 
represented is that a given marker of motor processing should be found in 
correlation with an outcome being brought about. For an outcome (as opposed to a 
mere sequence of bodily configurations) to be represented, two conditions need to 
be fulfilled (as suggested most recently by Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014, and 
 
9 This clever manipulation was used in an experiment by Umiltà and colleagues 
(2008): two different pairs of pliers were constructed, such that, with one pair of 
pliers, closing one’s fingers around the handles would result in an object being 
grasped, and, with the other pair of pliers, the exact same sequence of bodily 
configurations would result in an object being released. 
 20 
earlier, e.g., by Sinigaglia 2010). First, the same marker of motor processing (e.g., 
the same rate of neural discharge) should be found by holding the outcome fixed, 
but varying sequences of bodily configurations. Secondly, different markers of 
motor processes (e.g., markedly different rates of neural discharge) should be 
found by holding a sequence of bodily configurations fixed, but altering the 
outcome, e.g. by changing contextual factors.  
 In the case of motor actions such as grasping, we have precisely this sort 
of ideal evidence, under both conditions required to say that an outcome, as 
opposed to a sequence of bodily configurations, is represented motorically (as has 
been observed, e.g., by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008, as well as by Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia 2014). For example, there is evidence that in the premotor cortex of the 
macaque monkey brain—specifically, in the area F5—there are populations of 
neurons that activate in correlation with a grasping act regardless of whether 
grasping is executed with the hand as opposed to with the mouth (Rizzolatti et al. 
1988),10 thus indicating that the same outcome is represented while varying 
sequences of bodily configurations.  
 But there is also evidence to the effect that there are neurons—also in the 
area F5—that, in response to the same sequence of bodily configurations—e.g., 
 
10 Here I am appealing to single-cell recordings in the macaque monkey brain 
based on the idea, supported by Rizzolatti and colleagues (2002), that there is a 
sufficient analogy between this particular region of the macaque monkey brain 
and the Brodmann area 44 of the human brain. 
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that involved in grasping an object—fire differentially depending on the context in 
which grasping is performed. The different contexts were constituted by the 
presence or absence of an object to be grasped (Umiltà et al. 2001; see also 
Villiger et al. 2011). Therefore, motor actions are AMROs, in virtue of their 
outcomes being represented motorically. 
 
5.2 Motor actions could be categorically perceived 
Let me take stock. In section 4, I reported Butterfill’s (2015) observation that the 
articulating phonemes and expressing emotions are AMROs, as well as his 
conjecture that facial expressions of emotions could be processed as AMROs 
within the context of categorical perception, and, relatedly, sorted into categories 
consisting in motorically represented outcomes (e.g., happiness being expressed). 
In the previous subsection, I have pointed out that motor actions are AMROs, too. 
On the basis of this observation and of Butterfill’s conjecture, it becomes plausible 
articulating phonemes, expressing emotions and motor actions should be species 
of the same genus—namely, AMROs. Given that both speech and facial 
expressions of emotions are categorically perceived, I put forward the conjecture 
that motor actions could be categorically perceived, too. By analogy with the case 
of speech and (according to Butterfill’s conjecture) facial expressions of emotions, 
my conjecture has it that the categories into which categorical perception would 
subdivide motor actions is the motorically represented outcomes around which 
motor actions are coordinated—e.g., something being grasped. 
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 Considering the possibility that motor actions could be categorically 
perceived might sound surprising, given that many instances of categorical 
perception that I have discussed in this chapter involve static stimuli, such as 
facial configuration or colour hues. Even though in section 4.3 I mentioned the 
possibility that static stimuli could trigger the perception of events in relation to 
Butterfill’s conjecture, the fact remains that motor actions themselves are events. 
How could the idea that motor actions are categorically perceived be 
operationalised?11 
 Let me now clarify that the notion of categorical perception is perfectly 
compatible with the idea that the stimuli to be categorised are events rather than 
objects. This is clearest if you think of the case of the categorical perception of 
speech. The stimuli employed to test this phenomenon, as said in section 3, are 
acoustic sounds that constitute phonemes. These are events. But how might this 
work in practice in the case of motor actions? 
 That motor actions are categorically perceived means that the following 
should in principle be possible. A pair of distinct motor actions should be 
identified—one could be grasping with the hand, since it is a widely studied case, 
and another could be pushing away an object with the back of one’s fingers. The 
two different motor actions should be performed with the same hand. On the basis 
of these two different motor actions, a number of stimuli—either static, such as 
 
11 I am grateful to a reviewer of this volume for inviting me to discuss this 
important issue. 
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snapshots, or dynamic, such as short clips—should be obtained, such that pairs of 
neighbouring stimuli involve bodily configurations (or sequences of bodily 
configurations, if the stimuli are dynamic), that differ by the same amount in terms 
of their kinematic features (e.g., distance between finger tips). If it is true that 
humans categorically perceive motor actions, then pairs of neighbouring stimuli 
should be hard to tell apart when they fall within the same category (e.g., 
something being grasped), but easy to distinguish when each belongs to a different 
category (something being grasped vs. something being pushed away), despite the 
fact that, by design, all the neighbouring pairs of stimuli differ by the same 
amount. 
 As to what the categories could be beyond something being grasped and 
(maybe) something being pushed away, there is evidence that specific neural 
populations in the premotor cortex become active in correlation with different 
action types, such as grasping (Rizzolatti et al. 1988). As mentioned in section 5.1, 
the activation of these populations of neurons correlates with outcomes, such as 
something being grasped. The fact that the organising principle is outcomes rather 
than sequences of bodily configurations has been already expounded in section 
5.1: the same neural activation can be observed in correlation with different 
sequences of bodily configurations bringing about the same outcome, and same 
sequences of bodily configurations are treated differently in terms of neural 
discharge depending on how the context shapes the overall outcome.  
 Taken together, these action types constitute what has been referred to as 
a motor vocabulary, or a vocabulary of motor acts (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; see 
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Jeannerod 2006). The outcomes to which the actions forming this motor 
vocabulary are directed are therefore plausible candidates for the categories in 
which humans subdivide motor actions, but it is again an empirical question 
whether they really provide the categories that humans are sensitive to.12 More 
generally, of course, whether my conjecture holds is an empirical question, to be 
settled by means of experimental evidence.   
 
6. How the conjecture would explain neural mechanisms involved in 
the processing of AMROs 
 
In this last section, I am going to show that, if the conjecture I am proposing 
turned out to be true, this would provide a good explanation of data we currently 
have about the involvement of certain neural mechanisms in the processing of 
motor actions, as well as a unifying explanation for the involvement of certain 
neural mechanisms in the processing of other AMROs. 
 First of all, we need a bit more detail about how categorical perception 
occurs. A reasonable model of how this could occur, that has been put forward in 
 
12 Support for the aspect of the conjecture concerning the categories into which 
motor actions are sorted is given by evidence that the organisation of actions in 
the brain in terms of outcomes influences our processing of action-related 
language (e.g., Marino and colleagues 2017). I am grateful to a reviewer of this 
chapter for bringing this to my attention. 
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the case of the categorical perception of speech (Liberman and Mattingly 1985), is 
that, in the course of categorically perceiving a certain auditory stimulus, a 
hypothesis is made as to what phoneme is being articulated, and the hypothesis is 
checked against the available evidence. If the evidence is compatible with the 
hypothesis, the hypothesis is reinforced. If the evidence is incompatible with the 
hypothesis, the hypothesis is revised. 
 This model has been further supplemented in the following way: 
hypothesising which phoneme is being articulated would involve the activation of 
motor processes in the observer’s brain that would normally be involved in the 
production of one’s own speech. The Motor Theory of Speech Perception 
(Liberman and Mattingly 1985) makes precisely this suggestion. Thus could 
motor processes be involved in the categorical perception of speech.13 
 As part of his proposed conjecture, Butterfill (2015) suggests that the 
categorical perception of expressions of emotions could work in an analogous 
way: a hypothesis could be made about what emotion is being expressed, and the 
hypothesis would be checked against the available evidence. Specifically, 
Butterfill suggests that a hypothesis as to which emotion is being expressed could 
involve the activation of processes in an observer that would be activated were the 
observer to have that emotion herself (2015, p. 448). In particular, this would 
 
13 As I mentioned in footnote 7, this aspect of the Motor Theory of Speech 
Perception still stands. 
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result in outcomes being motorically represented in an observer (he notes this has 
already been proposed by Adolphs 2001). 
 After putting forward this aspect of the conjecture, Butterfill notes that 
there is evidence suggesting that this is precisely what could occur in the case of 
the processing of expressions of emotions. He reports evidence that, on the one 
hand, processes that would occur when one is having a certain emotion also occur 
while observing other individuals’ emotions (Bastiaansen et al. 2009; Gallese et al. 
2004; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; van der Gaag et al. 2007; Wicker et al. 
2003). Moreover, there is evidence that disrupting the occurrence of these 
processes in an observer interferes with the recognition of others’ emotions 
(Niedenthal et al. 2001; Oberman et al. 2007; Pitcher et al. 2008). 
Let us therefore see whether an analogous model of the processing of 
motor actions is viable. Indeed, various sources have proposed a model according 
to which motor actions are recognised through a process of making hypotheses 
and checking them against the available evidence that involves the activation of 
motor processes in an observer (see, e.g., Kilner et al. 2007).14  
 
14 The notion of understanding from the inside has been put forward to indicate 
cases in which an observer motorically represents an outcome that an observed 
individual is trying to fulfil (e.g., Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010). An interesting 
topic of investigation, which is best left to another occasion, is the relationship 
between the motor processes hypothesized to be involved in the processing of 
motor actions and mindreading. 
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An especially pertinent source of evidence for motor process involvement 
in the categorical perception of motor actions is given by an experiment carried 
out by Cattaneo and colleagues (2010). In this experiment, a sensory-motor 
adaptation paradigm was employed: participants were trained to perform either a 
push away or a pull towards movement with their hand while blindfolded. This 
motor training was shown to have an impact on the subsequent visual recognition 
of analogous hand actions, and resulted in ambiguous stimuli being classified as 
push away movements following a training involving pull towards movements, 
and viceversa. The fact that activating a certain motor process by means of a 
repeatedly performed action impacts on the labelling of a subsequently observed 
action suggests that motor processes are involved in the identification of 
outcomes: if the recognition of a motor action was a purely visual phenomenon, it 
is unclear why motor training in the absence of visual stimuli should impact on it.  
Moreover, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the ventral 
premotor cortex suppressed the adaptation aftereffect in the recognition of an 
action. That is, a temporary disruption of areas involved in the production of 
motor actions impacted on the recognition of those actions (Cattaneo et al. 2010). 
This result dovetails nicely with that reported previously, to the effect that 
disrupting the occurrence of the processes involved in expressing an emotion in an 
observer interferes with the recognition of others’ emotions. 
Now, if motor actions turned out to be categorically perceived, along 
with speech and facial expressions of emotions, a unifying explanation could be 
given as to why areas involved in the production of speech, expressions of 
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emotions and motor actions seem to have a role in the perceptual processing of 
these stimuli. This would be explained in the following way. Articulations of 
phonemes, expressions of emotions and motor actions are all AMROs. Categorical 
perception, if Butterfill’s conjecture and my proposed one turn out to be correct, 
sorts AMROs into categories corresponding to motorically represented outcomes. 
This categorisation relies on a process of hypothesis testing that draws on the very 
processes involved in the production of these stimuli. This is how the conjecture 
that motor actions are categorically perceived completes Butterfill’s conjecture to 
that expressions of emotions are categorically perceived as AMROs, giving rise to 
a unifying theoretical framework. This same framework would accommodate the 
idea that categorically perceiving speech sorts stimuli into phonemes conceived as 




In the foregoing, I have presented my conjecture that humans categorically 
perceive motor actions. I have done so by drawing an analogy with expressions of 
emotions and articulations of phonemes, which can be plausibly thought of as 
actions directed to motorically represented outcomes, as are motor actions. My 
conjecture builds on an interpretation of the categorical perception of speech 
whereby acoustic signals are processed as actions directed to a motorically 
represented outcome, and the categories consist in motorically represented 
outcomes. My conjecture also builds on the one recently put forward by Butterfill 
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(2015), which interprets the categorical perception of facial expressions of 
emotions in terms of facial expressions of emotions being processed as AMROs. 
The two conjectures and the interpretation of the categorical perception of speech 
in terms of the processing of actions naturally complement each other, and 
together give rise to a unifying theoretical framework, which could explain data 
showing the involvement of motor processes in an observer’s brain when 
processing others’ actions directed to motorically represented outcomes. While 
this does not show the conjecture to be true, it makes it worthy of consideration. 
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